The Climate Cost of GeoEconomic Fragmentation and Renewable Energy Geopolitics

This dissertation explores the impact of Geo-Economic Fragmentation (GEF) and greening policies of the US, the EU and China, on the global transition to renewable energy and achieving Net Zero by 2050. The study focuses on how recent geopolitical events have deepened economic fragmentation and have hindered global cooperation. The dissertation also examines how greening policies such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Net Zero Industry Act are reshaping industries and prioritising energy independence over collective global action that could create unequal progress toward climate goals. 

The findings reveal that greening policies are using protectionist elements to break valuable global supply chains, an outcome of globalisation. Meanwhile, China’s dominance in critical minerals and technology related to it exacerbates competition and further fragments the global economy. Developing countries face significant barriers, such as limited investments and access to technology, that delay their transition to green energy. The study concludes that without coordinated global cooperation the achievement of Net Zero by 2050 remains at risk, with only select nations potentially reaching their targets.

1. Introduction: 

The era of neoliberal globalisation began around the 1970s. Globalisation allowed countries to integrate their economies with other countries in a seamless way by establishing Global Value Chains (GVCs) where the particular products came out to be the output of valuable additions from across the world making it affordable and accessible to a wide range of consumers. This integration of economy facilitated by free trade agreements, open borders and international cooperation fostered an environment where goods, services and capital flowed globally with relative ease—the period of globalisation reached its peak before the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 which exposed the risks of a hyper-connected global economy. The aftermath of the GFC, growing competition among nations along with multiple geopolitical events is now shaping the world towards a new paradigm: Geo-economic Fragmentation (GEF).

GEF is changing the way our economies are integrated. This geopolitical phenomenon results from increased trade restrictions, sanctions, rising protectionism and realignment of economic alliances. Other contributing factors include the ever-growing geopolitical rivalries, economic nationalism and the desire to mitigate risks associated with global dependencies. GEF is also a strategic way by which nations are trying to prioritise their national security and reduce their dependence on others by engaging in reshoring and friend-shoring geopolitically. As powers engage in GEF, the intricate web of GVCs, which has been the backbone of modern economic growth faces unknown challenges. 

One of the most critical sectors affected by GEF is renewable energy. The transition to renewable energy sources and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are essential to mitigate climate change. Achieving the ambitious feat of  “Net Zero” carbon emissions by 2050 is crucial for limiting the rise in global temperatures by 1.5℃ and averting the severe impact of climate change. However, this mitigation heavily relies on complex and globally diverse supply chains for renewable energy resources. Critical minerals such as Rare Earth Elements (REE), and other critical materials like cobalt, lithium and nickel are indispensable for the production of wind turbines, solar panels and battery cells. GEF also hinders technological sharing and advancements such as intellectual properties (IP) and patents which are crucial for this change.

Despite the urgency of climate change, geopolitical tensions and GEF slow down the progress toward a sustainable future. The United States, the European Union (EU) and China as major powers are at the forefront of these dynamics along with countries rich in oil and gas like Russia and Saudi Arabia and renewable energy mineral-rich countries like Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Australia.  Each of these regions is trying to balance economic interests and environmental commitments, often resulting in conflicting policies and strategies. For instance, the US-China trade deal imposed tariffs and retaliatory tariffs on electric vehicles and other clean energy sectors. Similarly, the EU aims to be the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050 but faces challenges from internal and external geopolitical pressures. 

The repercussions of these tensions come with significant costs to almost all the world’s economies across all sectors. Supply chain disruptions could lead to increased costs, delays in advancements and deployment of carbon-neutral infrastructure and hinder the narrow margin we have to achieve Net Zero by 2050. Additionally, GEF fuels geopolitical rivalry as the competition for resourcing critical minerals grows, further complicating international cooperation on climate change initiatives. 

This dissertation seeks to answer: How does Geo-Economic Fragmentation and the geopolitics around renewable energy sources disrupt the crucial supply chains and delay the progress towards the Net Zero 2050 goal? To address this question, I analyse recent geopolitical events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US-China trade war, illustrating how sanctions and increased trade barriers have led to growing protectionism among nations. This protectionism has incentivised countries to increase trade with their geopolitical and security allies. Alongside I examine the various policies like the US CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the EU Green Deal to highlight the diverse strategies employed by nations to achieve Net Zero 2050. 

Highlights of the findings of this research are as follows:

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the decoupling of the economy that followed the US-China trade war have underscored the vulnerability of countries highly dependent on certain regions for energy and technology. This realisation has driven the US, EU and China to prioritise energy independence with a strong focus on sustainability as the path forward.

Net Zero 2050, is a framework by IEA to keep the global temperatures below 1.5 degrees Celsius to mitigate the most severe effects of global warming. Collectively 38 countries have come together and pledged to transition to a green economy by 2050.  However, the greening policies adopted by the US and the EU, while aiming for this goal, have inadvertently deepened economic fragmentation and disrupted established supply chains. This is largely due to protectionist measures like reshoring and friend shoring which pull manufacturing away from global value chains. While the US and EU policies focus on boosting local industries, China’s policies impose their own protectionist measures and threaten to regulate supply chains of critical minerals and rare earth elements- crucial for green transition. This global tug-of-war over resources and technologies exacerbates fragmentation and delays the collective progress needed to mitigate climate targets.

Reshoring of industries and diversification of supply chains may help certain countries approach their Net Zero goals by 2050, but it comes at the cost of a significantly more fragmented global economy. This makes the overall journey to Net Zero more challenging and uneven. Without a holistic, collaborative approach, countries risk delaying the development and deployment of green technologies, hindering their abilities to share these innovations with other countries, particularly emerging markets. 

More than nationalistic strategies, achieving Net Zero by 2050 demands global coordination. The refusal of major powers and international organisations to work together will likely result in either partial achievement or a significant delay beyond 2050, with dire consequences as climate change accelerates.

2. Brief Literature Review

The introduction outlined the concept of GEF and the geopolitics of renewable energy indicating the research question and structure. The literature review synthesises key studies and compares policy documents and expert opinions to provide a concrete foundation on Net Zero 2050, GEF and supply chain disruptions, and the geopolitics of critical metals.

2.1 IEA and Net Zero 2050:

To address climate change, the global community strives to achieve zero GHG emissions by 2050, limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This requires comprehensive policy action and commitment from various stakeholders, including governments, organisations, and regions. The International Energy Agency's (IEA) Net Zero 2050 approach has been widely adopted, with 30 member countries (such as Australia, the UK, the US, and the EU) and 8 association countries, including China, India, and Indonesia, aligning their climate targets with this framework.

Key actions outlined by IEA to achieve Net Zero 2050 are: 

(1) immediate action (2020-2025): requiring countries and corporations to develop policy frameworks and invest in research and development (R&D) and innovation in technologies like fuel cells, solar, wind and hydropower. 

(2) Short-term actions (2025-2030): this period requires higher adoption of EVs, investment in charging grids and phasing out internal combustion engines. IEA also advises significantly increasing the capacity of renewable energy sources and implementing carbon pricing mechanisms such as carbon taxes. 

(3) Medium-term actions (2030-2040):  focuses on industrial decarbonisation, promoting sustainable land and agricultural practices and transitioning towards a circular economy, emphasising reusing, recycling and sustainable resource management.

(4) Long-term actions (2040-2050): completely banning internal combustion engines, deploying large-scale negative emissions technologies and strengthening global collaboration to ensure equitable access to technology, finance and resources to achieve every country’s net-zero targets. 

Economic and legislative policies are key drivers of this transition. Incentive-driven adoption encourages businesses and individuals to shift towards cleaner energy sources, while government policies and regulations play a crucial role in accelerating the transition to renewable energy. These regulations can also have spill-over effects, influencing other countries and regions to adopt similar measures. However, financial barriers such as high upfront costs for renewable energy infrastructure and substantial R&D expenses make working collectively towards Net Zero 2050 challenging. Consequently, countries with financial capacity, like China, the US, and the EU, are leading this transition. This dynamic places additional pressure on these leading nations to assist emerging and low-income countries in achieving this transition within the given timeframe.

 Geo-economic fragmentation (GEF) will negatively impact crisis resolution and the provision of global public goods like climate action and pandemic preparedness, as fragmented economies, tend to prioritise short-term economic benefits over long-term sustainable objectives. Therefore, achieving Net Zero 2050 requires more collaboration among countries and organisations like the World Economic Forum (WEF), IMF, and the World Bank now more than ever.

2.2 From Globalisation to GeoEconomic Fragmentation:

In his book Development and Social Change, Philip McMichael expands on the importance of the Bretton Woods System and its institutions in accelerating development after the Second World War. From the late 1970s and following decades, the “West” focused on spreading the agenda of free market capitalism and privatisation with limited government spending with the help of the IMF, the World Bank (earlier the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development) and the WTO. Expanding on this, Neoliberalism by Damien Cahill and Martijn Konings highlights that the globalisation project reached its height before the GFC of 2007-08. After the GFC global flows of goods, services and finance have never reached the same peak also referred to as slowbalisation or reverse globalisation or deglobalisation. 

We get more results of deglobalisation following the US-China trade war and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In a discussion paper titled “The Backlash of Globalization” Italo Colantone, Gianmarco Ottaviano and Piero Stanig find that the reasons for this reversal are due to the rising trade tensions among the US-China and increasing scepticism about the benefits of globalisation. Though the trends are predating events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic have further fueled this reversal.

Data from the Global Trade Alert organisation shows that trade restrictions imposed by countries on goods, services and investments were the highest (around 2,500 restrictions) in December 2022. Other contributing data from the IMF based on corporate earnings reports show a sharp rise in the mention of terms like “reshoring, friend shoring and nearshoring”. The IMF Staff Discussion Notes documents these developments, coins the term “geoeconomic fragmentation” and defines it as “a policy-driven reversal of global economic integration often guided by strategic conditions”. They further add that other factors resulting in GEF are geopolitical rivalry and a desire to incentivise production and employment within national borders. 

2.3 GEF’s Impact on Supply Chains: 

GVCs are an important part of economic integration achieved with the help of international trade rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) now known as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). One of the important characteristics of GEF is that countries are involved in: 

(1)Reshoring- to bring businesses and manufacturing facilities back to their country to gain control of supply chains and depend less on other countries, signs of which are shown in the US CHIPS and Science Act (2022), the IRA (2022) and the EU Green Deal (2019) which I discuss in detail further in the section on comparison of greening policies. 

(2) Friend-shoring- trading with countries which have the same political or ideological stance. Like increasing oil and energy-related partnerships between Russia and China after heavy trade sanctions were imposed on Russia. 

And (3) nearshoring- where business operations are moved to a nearby country often within the same region or continent. 

Further research on trade agreements by Dadush and Enzo shows that almost two-thirds of the world is involved in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and regional trade agreements (RTAs). Trade agreements like NAFTA and others among ASEAN countries reflect these findings. International government organisations like BRICS have emerged as a significant counterpart to the G7, as numerous countries are seeking its membership. The organisation's appeal lies in its commitment to foster cooperation among emerging economies, offering an alternative to collaborate on global issues and sustainable development, unlike the G7 which is a group of seven advanced democratic economies.

The discussion paper further expands on how the WTO is failing and losing its place to account countries for breaking its rules on trade exemplified by the US subsidies on in-house manufactured EVs. These cases shed light on the deepening of fragments when it comes to energy and renewable energy sectors as geopolitical rivalries threaten the economy and security for the future. 

2.4 Importance of Critical Minerals for renewable energy technology and the concerning geopolitics: 

electric vehicles (EVs), which are a result of path-breaking technology, government policies, critical materials,

Renewable energy technology depends heavily on critical minerals and REEs. Contrary to their name rare earth elements(REEs) are found in large quantities across the globe but their ores are relatively less common when compared to other metals like iron or copper. These critical minerals and REEs are essential not only for manufacturing parts of an electric vehicle (lithium and nickel for batteries along with neodymium and terbium for EV motor magnets) but also for other important components aiding the renewable energy transition, such as semiconductor chips (silicon, gallium and germanium), solar panels (silicon and indium), components for windmills, turbines and energy-power grids (zinc and lead).  The growing demand for these minerals has made them important geopolitical tools for the countries that contain them and for those involved in their extraction, refinement and manufacturing parts, preparing them for the future.

The major concern for the US and EU is China’s upper hand in the production of critical minerals. China produces 80% of the world’s gallium and 60% of its natural graphite. China is the largest producer of 18 of 30 critical metals. Over time China has expanded its grasp on these metals globally holding a majority stake in cobalt mines of DRC which are crucial for EV and other renewable technologies. For the “West” it is important to reduce their reliance on China for supplies of critical minerals and products like lithium batteries, as their reliance poses a major security risk. Hence we have seen acts like the IRA and EU Green Deal which try to reduce their dependence on China and diversify their supply chains related to critical metals and green technology. While the US also has substantial mineral reserves, they are not comparable to China. China’s dominance in this market has created a monopolistic situation due to its head start in metal production, state-centred industries, high incentives and resource-sharing policies allowing it to control the prices of extracted metals and end products in the free market. I will discuss Chinese policies further.

Countries like China and the US are in strong positions because they not only consume more but also produce more renewable energy technology due to substantial reserves of their minerals. However, other countries with significant mineral resources, such as Brazil, Vietnam, India, and Greenland, are also taking strategic actions to balance economic development and strengthen their position in the future.

Consider the example of electric vehicles (EVs), which are a result of path-breaking technology, government policies, critical materials,The next section will analyse case studies that have significantly fueled GEF to better understand its practical implications and influence on global renewable energy dynamics and subsidies. Here we realise that the relationship between the major EV manufacturers (US, China) and the countries rich in REEs (Brazil, Greenland) is of strategic importance. This dynamic has allowed neutral countries to evaluate their future based on which bloc of geo-economic fragment they join. The adoption of EVs will also have a ripple effect on oil-rich nations, reducing trade, investments and job opportunities as new trade routes and deals are established. EV adoption can wipe out up to “$19 trillion from oil industry revenue by 2040” posing a major financial risk for the key players in the oil industry. 

While this literature provides a comprehensive overview of the dynamics of GEF and renewable energy further research has to be done on long-term geopolitical strategies. There is enough literature on China’s dominance in the critical minerals sector but we do not find in-depth studies of long-term geopolitical strategies other nations are adopting to mitigate this reliance on Chinese resources. Another important aspect is to find out how GEF impacts global collaboration, particularly on climate initiatives. With this paper, this is what I intend to find. 

The next section will analyse case studies that have significantly fueled GEF to better understand its practical implications and influence on global renewable energy dynamics.

3. Case Studies (Brief Overview): 

The case studies selected here are those that have fueled the geopolitical phenomenon of GEF. This section does exclude case studies such as that of the GFC (2007-08), Brexit, which followed a referendum on Britain leaving the EU in 2016, and the COVID-19 pandemic. While these events have had significant impacts, the cases discussed below are centred around the geopolitics of energy and the dominant forces driving GEF: the EU, the US and China. After looking at the case studies I will analyse how these events have led to disruptions of supply chains and a more fragmented world of trade. 

3.1 China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): 

China’s BRI or One Belt One Road (OBOR) is a reform initiated in 2013 to boost China’s economic growth, which had appeared stagnant before that year. Researchers have compared it to America's Marshall Plan noting its ambition to potentially replace the American-led international financial architecture. Though the Chinese ministry looks at it as an important opportunity to create new pillars for economic development which helps them to look “outside China”, and foster economic growth and partnership. The BRI project also involves the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) alongside the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank).

The BRI project has three features:

1. The “Belt”: consists of several routes that connect China to Europe through Asia, Russia and the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean through Central Asia, West Asia reaching the Persian Gulf. The Belt will rely on major cities to serve as pillars and major economic and trade zones to create a Eurasian land bridge and foster economic cooperation among China, Mongolia, and East and West Asia. 
2. The Maritime Silk “Road”: runs from China’s coastal ports to Africa and Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Road will rely on major ports to ensure safe and efficient logistics routes.
3. The Economic Corridors: Like the China-Pakistan economic corridor and the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar economic corridor. 

The BRI connects at least 60 countries equivalent to 64% of the world's population (4.4 billion)  and 30% of the global GDP ($ 21 trillion). This initiative fills an important gap in fostering international economic projects for developing and underdeveloped countries. Something which the IMF and the World Bank have failed to do effectively now that the system is more than half a century old. 

3.2 The US-China Trade War (2018): 

The US-China trade war represents a significant shift in the global economic landscape with lasting impacts on trade, investment and international relations among the two biggest economies of today. 

In 2017 under President Donald Trump, the US Trade Representative (USTR) concluded a Section 301 investigation against China, finding unethical and unfair trade practices. These practices included industrial espionage, cyber-hacking and the predatory acquisition of foreign technology. In April 2018, President Trump announced 25% tariffs on $50 billion worth of imports from China. China retaliated with 25% tariffs on $ 50 billion worth of US exports. The first imposed tariff of the trade war was on July 6th, 2018 when both the countries imposed tariffs and retaliatory tariffs of 25% duties on $34 billion of imported products.  These products later came to be known as “List 1” and included washing machines, solar panels, agricultural produce (soybeans), cars and electrical appliances. The tariffs imposition from both sides continued till following “List 2” and “List 3” products as well till September 2018.

On December 1 2018 President Trump and Xi announced a 90-day truce and considered negotiations which failed and by January 2019 tariff escalations were resumed resulting in “List 4A” products like clothing and footwear, and “List 4B” products containing consumer electronics and toys. 

In January 202o, the US and China signed a “Phase One” agreement as an attempt to de-escalate the trade war. The agreement also addressed issues related to intellectual property theft, technology transfer, and transparency between the two governments. When President Biden took over the office in 2020, diplomatic engagement continued with some of the tariffs still being in place. The Biden administration has focused more on considering China as a strategic competitor. In 2022, Biden emphasised building resilient supply chains reducing dependence on China, and investing in domestic manufacturing of critical technologies, including renewable energy. This focus was later reflected in the US CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act.

3.3 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022): 

The most recent geopolitical event which has further divided the world is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The core of the Russia-Ukraine conflict lies in a “security dilemma” that has now spread to the rest of Europe, manifesting in the form of migrant crises and energy crises. For Ukraine, moving closer to the European Union and NATO is rational, as it provides protection from Russia and allows for strong trade ties with these alliances. However, from Russia’s perspective, this would jeopardise its security, prompting Russia to exercise power through military action even before Ukraine could join NATO or the EU.

On February 23, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that a “special military operation” would begin in Ukraine. This decision came after the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) refused to comply with the demands of the Kremlin. Putin's demand to reduce the tension in Europe included a ban on Ukraine joining NATO and limiting the deployment of troops and weapons on NATO's eastern side. Russia and Ukraine had substantial trade relations, particularly in coal, refined petroleum and natural gas with their trade partnership reaching $8.13 billion. In addition to economic ties, both countries share significant cultural and historical connections. Putin feared if Ukraine becomes a partner of NATO, along with Finland and Balkan countries it could pose the greatest security threat to Russia.

 Since the invasion several trade sanctions have been imposed by the West and Europe, but instead of crippling Russia, it has helped to make it stronger in some sectors of its economy like non-renewable energy. The sanctions have also prompted countries like China and India to trade with Russia in local currencies.

4. Deepening Fragments: 

Having provided an overview of these case studies we can now look at how each of these events has contributed to the deepening of GEF. Each of these events has significantly impacted global economic dynamics, altering trade patterns, investment flows and geopolitical alliances. By understanding their specific contributions to GEF we can better appreciate the complexities of the current global economic landscape and challenges that are delaying the transition to a carbon-neutral future. 

China’s BRI was designed to enhance global trade and stimulate economic growth, yet, it has also led to significant geopolitical tensions and economic fragmentation. The initiative has created new dependencies and vulnerabilities, diverting supply chain routes from established ones, and introducing new risks and sustainability issues. 

The state-centred communist economic structure of China has allowed it to exert overarching control over the projects under BRI in various countries. For example, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have become deeply entrenched in global port ecosystems, particularly in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe. A notable instance of this was in 2018 when China’s CMport took control of the debt-ridden Sri Lankan port of Hambantota. Chinese port holding companies including CMPort have gone forward to show massive Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in key ports across  Antwerp, Rotterdam, Valencia and Malta to name a few. 

However, it is not true that China has plans to use these ports for its military bases but the entrenchment has led to distortions in trade flows, as ports with significant Chinese involvement are more likely to prioritise Chinese interests over other partners.

Additionally, the debt incurred by countries hosting BRI infrastructure has raised concerns about economic sovereignty and long-term financial stability. Nations such as Pakistan ($ 27.4 billion), Ethiopia ($ 7.4 billion) Djibouti and Angola have become examples of economic strain associated with the BRI by the end of 2021. The initiative has fueled increased rivalries between China and other major powers such as India and the US, which view China’s growing influence as a strategic challenge. This has added to the fragmentation as countries align themselves based on geopolitical considerations rather than purely economics. In 2019, the European Commission declared China “an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”. Consequently, the EU adopted new rules for better screening of FDIs, to consider the implications of FDIs in critical infrastructure including ports. The underlying worry is that these investments could grant China undue political leverage, although the EU also suggests that using state-owned companies as overt political tools could be costly for China, backfiring on its global image and economic interests.

The US-China trade war has had profound implications for global supply chains leading to economic decoupling between the world’s two largest economies and calibrating global trade dynamics. The trade war has undone three to five years of growth among GVCs in affected countries. To reduce tariffs many Chinese companies shifted their production facilities to other Southeast Asian countries, such as Vietnam and Thailand. 

Both countries have sought to reduce their economic dependencies, particularly in critical technologies. For instance, China has accelerated its effort to develop its semiconductor industry and reduce reliance on US technology. Meanwhile, the US has come up with plans to increase FDI in Taiwan’s Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) , the largest chip semiconductor company in the world of any kind. 

Furthermore, the trade war has exacerbated the technological rivalry between the US and China, leading to the emergence of competing standards and ecosystems. This rivalry extends beyond two nations, influencing global technological innovation and adoption. As countries increasingly find themselves compelled to choose between American and Chinese technologies, a bifurcated global technological landscape is emerging. This division delays the development and deployment of crucial technologies needed to combat climate change, demonstrating how GEF can impose climate and economic costs through various channels like trade integration, technology diffusion and heightened uncertainty.

Even before Putin’s war, oil and gas prices were surging as the world was recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021 due to insufficient supplies.  These skyrocketing prices helped to generate revenues for Russia and other petrostates, despite the global push for a clean energy transition. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompted fear in the European Union to overcome their energy dependency on Russia's substantial natural gas and oil infrastructure. Faced with sanctions and trade restrictions from the West and Europe, President Putin weaponized Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. In February 2022, Germany halted the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project in solidarity with Ukraine, forcing the EU and UK to explore alternative energy sources, whether renewable or through increased natural gas imports from Norway and Algeria. After the US imposed a ban on Russian oil and gas, the inflation in oil and gas prices in America forced the Biden administration to tap into their domestic reserves and sell cheaper and more polluting E15 gasoline. Although sanctions are not directly environmental measures, they exacerbate isolation and hinder international cooperation on shared challenges.

In response to the sanctions, Russia has forged strategic partnerships with countries like China and India conducting relatively cheaper natural gas trade in local currency than before the sanctions. While many countries have tried to be neutral in this conflict, certain countries have benefitted more than the West might like. Additionally, Russia has also partnered with other Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) to divert oil and gas flows away from the EU. This region, along with China, remains heavily reliant on oil and gas.

Overall the recent geopolitical tensions have had three main effects on countries and global supply chains:

1. Countries have recognised their over-reliance on particular sources and supply chains for critical goods, such as oil, gas and semiconductors.
2. This realisation has driven major economies to adopt strategies to diversify their supply chains, sourcing critical materials and strategically investing in assets that enhance their safety and self-reliance i.e. renewable technology. 
3. This environment has fostered technological rivalry and rising protectionism, particularly in sectors like energy and future technology, which are vital for global sustainability.

In the next section when we compare the greening policies of China, the US and the EU, providing evidence for the points made above and examining how these policies contribute to the fragmentation that ultimately undermines global efforts to mitigate climate change.

5. Greening Policies: A comparison of the US, the EU and Chinese strategies for green transition

To achieve Net-Zero 2050, which is aligned with the Paris Agreement 2015, nations have adopted comprehensive “greening policies” to reduce GHG emissions and transition to sustainable, low-carbon economies. These policies encompass various strategies, including green infrastructure investments, and promoting energy-efficient technologies such as electric vehicles. 

Each major economy has developed its approach to greening policies aligned with its economic structure, geopolitical priorities and technological capabilities. However, as we compare the greening policies, we observe a growing fragmentation of the world economy characterised by rising protectionism and decreasing interdependence. In the following sections, we delve into the specific strategies adopted by the US, the EU and China exploring how they contribute to the complexities and challenges of navigating an increasingly divided world.

5.1 The USA’s Way: Reshoring industries - securing supply chains

The US embarked on the journey towards greening its economy driven by a series of ambitious policies targeting renewable energy and positioning the country as a leader in this global manufacturing race. Under the Biden administration, the US intensified its focus on sustainability while simultaneously reducing its dependence on others, especially China. The most significant push to lead this race comes from the Inflation Reduction Act (the IRA) and the US CHIPS and Science Act. 

The IRA is expected to reduce GHG emissions by two-thirds between the current level and the US 2030 climate targets. The US aims to achieve this by bringing down the cost of developing clean energy and deploying the necessary technology.  The Biden administration plans to provide resources for upgrading the power grid, improving public transport by investing in zero-emission transport and school buses, installing a nationwide EV charging network and more.

The IRA builds up on the Build Back Better Act as it aims to rebuild the middle class by creating jobs, reducing costs and spurring long-term growth through the funding that aids the transition to a green economy. In the energy sector, the objectives are doubling the deployment of wind, solar and battery storage. Increasing the support for clean electricity and investing more in research and innovation for the energy sector. The transport and vehicle industries are being supported by investments in batteries and charging infrastructure. The IRA particularly emphasises growing the end-to-end battery supply chain, for a more secure and resilient supply chain.

The IRA plans to invest approximately $400 billion in climate-related projects over the next 10 years. These include subsidies for vehicle purchases, tax credits for electric cars, and tax credits for companies like leasing companies and taxi companies such as Uber so that they can buy more EVs. More subsidies roll out for manufacturers of clean-technology products including components used in renewable electricity generation as well as for developing other clean fuels like hydrogen. 

Another critical piece of legislation is the US CHIPS and Science Act which aims to establish the groundwork for dominating the semiconductors and microelectronics industries along with increased production of solar panels and EV components by encouraging accelerated investment in the design, development and manufacturing of semiconductors. The Act is considered by many the most significant legislation in the post-war period for advancing the nation's leadership in research, and development and restoring the US’s lead in the technology race.  Since the passing of the CHIPS and Science Act, there has been a resurgence of manufacturing facilities marked by a 116% increase. Semiconductor giants such as Micron, Qualcomm and GlobalFoundries have already deployed their funding to create new jobs and increase semiconductor manufacturing capacity. They also plan to increase this over the years to come. According to the US government, this Act will “lower costs, create jobs, strengthen supply chains and counter China”.

However, these acts are not solely focused on subsidies and investments. The IRA and Science Acts contain protectionist elements and can create trade imbalances through domestic rules, disregarding the WTO regulations. This could trigger similar actions from other nations. 

The large-scale manufacturing subsidies and low energy costs which are likely to be trade and market disruptive have also raised concerns of the EU.  European companies involved in green technology may begin shifting their manufacturing facilities to the US, driven by incentives and tax cuts provided by these acts. The subsidies and tax benefits also try to reduce reliance on Chinese inputs. For example, to qualify for tax benefits on EV purchases, the EVs must be assembled in North America (US, Mexico or Canada). Tax credits for the industries will also depend on the sources of critical and other minerals sourced for it. 50% of the battery components or critical minerals must come from the US or the countries it has FTAs with. From 2025 the use of minerals and batteries from “hostile countries” such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea will disqualify a vehicle from receiving tax credits. Additionally, renewable energy producers receive bonus subsidies if they use steel and iron manufactured entirely in the US, with these subsidies increasing over time, particularly for offshore wind production facilities.

These provisions secure the supply chains and boost the US’s ability to produce more domestically but they can also push other regions like the EU to source raw materials from China if companies begin shifting their production facilities in huge numbers. For the US, greening policies demonstrate that reshoring and nearshoring are the preferred strategies for transitioning to a green economy. Manufacturing semiconductors and other clean energy products in or near the US  ensures energy security, reduces dependence on foreign supply chains, and enhances domestic production capabilities.

5.2 The EU’s Way: Friend shoring and strategic autonomy

Unlike the US, the EU does not have singular green policies like the IRA and Science Act. Instead, it has a multitude of initiatives, both at the EU and national levels serving similar purposes. The major push towards greening comes from the Green Deal (2019), the Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) and the recently proposed Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), which serves as a response to the American IRA. 

With the EU Green Deal (2019), the EU aims to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, targeting a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, 40% by 2040 (compared to 1990 levels), and decoupling economic growth from polluting resource use. Almost every EU country offers subsidies for electric vehicles, either through tax benefits or purchase subsidies. The subsidies can range from € 10,000 (Cyprus) to €1250 (Czech Republic). In 2022, the total amount of subsidies added up to € 6 billion with an average of  € 6000 per vehicle. Unlike the IRA, the EU subsidies for EVs do not discriminate between EV manufacturers. The Green Deal also includes loans and grants for all EU countries under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) for the decarbonisation of the industry and strengthening clean-tech supply chains. Additionally, there are flagship programs involving cross-border innovation and infrastructure projects to further develop battery technology and clean fuels like hydrogen. 

With the Critical Raw Material Act, the EU aims to diversify its imports and exports, to forge new commercial alliances while also monitoring its “strategic dependencies”. With this act, the EU also wants to promote a circular raw materials economy- meaning that there is a major emphasis on recovering and recycling raw materials from waste facilities. By 2030, the EU aims to extract at least 10% of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials like cobalt and silicon, process at least 40%, and recycle at least 15% of these materials in the EU. Intending to reduce dependence, the act limits the use of more than 65% of its annual consumption at any stage of processing from a single third country. This approach is closely aligned with friend-shoring as the EU seeks to secure the supply chains through partnerships with like-minded countries, particularly those within the EU and neighbouring regions. Each of the EU states has also presented its National Recovery and Resilience Plan to digitise, innovate and transition ecologically. However, not all the member states are ready with the plans, and those that are prepared show potential for future fragmentation, as each country’s plan differs. For example, Germany, which excels in renewable energy technology, has significantly different plans compared to Poland and the Czech Republic, both of which rely heavily on coal power.

In response to the US’s IRA, which aims to attract industries and manufacturing facilities to the US, the EU announced the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA). The NZIA complements the Green Deal and aims to increase the EU’s manufacturing capacity for technologies that support clean energy and release GHG as little as possible. The NZIA classifies net-zero technologies as “strategic”, including solar, thermal, onshore wind and offshore renewables, batteries and fuel cells and more. With NZIA, the EU aims for the manufacturing capacities of these strategic technologies to reach at least 40% of the annual deployment needs by 2030.  This will help them to reach climate neutrality by 2050. The NZIA also proposes to cut red-tapism and reduce bureaucratic processes by the European Commission. 

While the NZIA is a response to the IRA, it does not address critical issues such as labour shortages, cost of labour and Europe’s geology. IRA offers huge incentives for these challenges and plans to increase them over time. Drawing other comparisons with the US’s way, the EU Green Deal and NZIA focus more on developing new technology, research and innovation, whereas the IRA focuses on mass deployment of the existing technology. Given the diversity of member states the EU’s approach could likely turn out to be more fragmented than expected, it could be much slower than expected, much more bureaucratic and ultimately delay the EU’s goal of carbon neutrality by 2050. 

5.3 The Chinese Way: State centralism and critical minerals upper hand

Chinese policies regarding greening the economy have gained momentum since the country joined the Paris Agreement in 2015. However, certain policies related to green technologies have been a part of Chinese Five Year Plans since the 1980s and the 1990s. China has significantly stepped up its greening strategies after the pandemic, though its goal to be carbon neutral lags when compared to the US and the EU, as it has set its target to be 2060, instead of 2050.

China overtook the US as the world's largest emitter of GHG in 2006 and today emits a quarter of the world's global carbon dioxide. The country has acknowledged that its peak petrol consumption is still ahead (2026-2030) while it begins to decouple from coal- its biggest source of energy. The Chinese government has faced criticism for continuing to build new coal plants, even as it ramps up renewable energy capacity. This dual approach reflects that China wants to transition to renewable energy resources without compromising its economic growth.

China has been supporting green tech development at multiple government levels. The Made in China 2025 (MIC2025) program, brings a major push for rapid advancements in domestic innovation. Like the EU, green technology here also holds a “strategic” value as China aims to repeat the success it has in the sector of global solar panels market and EV market. Xi Jinping’s government emphasises a cluster approach, with each cluster specialising in different areas. For example, Taijin focuses on promoting a “circular economy” by reducing and recycling industrial waste. Another cluster pilot program, “Green Industry Demonstration Bases”, aims to create market-oriented green systems and tech parks. 

China is investing heavily in the electrification of its transport sector. China lacked the legacy of Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles and could never compete with Japanese, American and German automakers. “This pushed the Chinese government to break away from the established technology and invest in a completely new territory: cars powered entirely by batteries”. The country is already the largest market for EVs, with over 30% of global EV sales occurring in China. The Chinese government has come up with subsidies ranging from $10,000-$20,000 per vehicle depending upon the city and the type of electric vehicle sold, to encourage adoption. These subsidies favour domestic companies and the companies which assemble vehicles in China. Alongside, China is outspending on subsidies in comparison to the US.

 China’s dominance in the EV market is supported by its control over the critical minerals supply chain. Despite the substantial natural reserves of the country, China has achieved a great feature when it comes to manufacturing and exporting green technology products such as solar panels, EVs, EV batteries, battery recycling infrastructure and windmills. China has the highest reserves of critical and rare earth metals (approx 40%) in the world. But the reasons for China’s rise are behind its industrial policies. These policies involved a private-public partnership between the Chinese renewable technology companies, mining companies and the government that allowed them to invest in R&D of these minerals, their extraction and refinement. R&D centres and training institutes came into the picture as companies received substantial support from the government and tax exemptions during China’s Reform and Opening Era (1950s) to set up these centres.  Due to this feature, China not only can transition to a green economy but also help other nations achieve similar goals while maintaining its status as the world’s manufacturing hub. 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative also extends its influence over partner countries and secures its supply chains, though concerns about a potential Chinese debt trap persist, as discussed in section 6. Along with state centralism, the most relevant to China’s green transition is “strategic autonomy” and securing its supply chains.

Ultimately the greening policies of the US, the EU and China reflect their distinct approaches to achieving climate goals, shaped by their unique economic structures, geopolitical ambitions and technological capabilities. The US, with the IRA and Science Act, is focusing on bringing back the manufacturing units to the US, a model that departs from globalisation. The US wants to reduce its dependence on foreign technologies, particularly from China, while creating jobs in the manufacturing sector by heavily incentivising and subsidising the green technology ecosystem. 

The EU, through its green deal and upcoming NZIA, aims to be climate neutral by 2050. The EU’s strategy leans towards friend-shoring, focusing on working together with its member states and like-minded countries to secure its supply chains. The EU policies are comprehensive but face challenges of fragmentation and slower implementation due to the diverse priorities of member states. Shortage of labour, labour costs, and the geoeconomic landscape also make this transition difficult. 

China’s approach is centrally driven and lags behind the EU and the US, with its carbon-neutral goal set for 2060. Still, China dominates key sectors essential for green transition and leverages this by exporting EVs, solar panels, EV batteries and other renewable technology. Despite criticism for its reliance on coal and the geopolitical implications of the BRI and its control over critical mineral supply chains, it contributes to Geo Economic Fragmentation, as countries seek to diversify their supply chains.  Together these strategies highlight the growing fragmentation of the world economy, leading to rising protectionism and reduced interdependence. In the last section, we explore how GEF ultimately delays the Net Zero 2050 agenda. 

6. Roadblocks: Why Net Zero by 2050 remains out of reach?

As we race towards the ambitious target of carbon neutrality in 2050, a troubling reality starts to emerge. We might be far from achieving the targets and this has less to do with the technology and our awareness and more with the complex web of geopolitics and economic interests of the fragmented world. To truly understand why Net Zero remains elusive we need to examine several key factors.

First, the continued powerful influence of petro-states and oil and gas companies in delaying green transition, prioritising short-term profits over sustainability. Many International Oil Companies (IOCs) have not committed to a low-carbon transition, nor are they diversifying their investments into renewables at the necessary pace. Hence, some oil companies like Shell and BP have “modestly” reduced investment in fossil fuels others like Chevron and ExxonMobil have resisted decarbonisation efforts. Although some firms have shifted their stance in response to the effects of carbon dioxide and methane on climate change, this shift is often strategic, with many choosing to position “natural gas” as a better alternative to crude oil rather than fully committing to renewable energy sources.

The IEA has underscored this issue, particularly in the light of the energy crisis exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The IEA observed that the world is nowhere near the trajectory needed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, with hydrocarbon demand not likely to fall quickly enough to meet the target. Even as the green transition unfolds, countries which keep producing cheap oil and gas such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, are likely to see increased demands for their resources from states that have not yet transitioned to renewable energy. 

This situation is a consequence of geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF) which has geopolitically aligned some countries towards a green economy while it has allowed petro-states to get closer and grow influence over regions. For instance, in 2021, Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed trilateral natural gas deals solidifying their economic ties.  Similarly, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have broadened their revenue sources from hydrocarbons and are decreasing the pace of regional decarbonisation. 

The strategic alliances of these states and the persistent reliance on fossil fuels by international oil companies not only delay their transitions but also contribute to a global slowdown in achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. With time this slowdown will harm the most underdeveloped and emerging economies which would lack the capital to transition but will have enough to continue buying oil and gas from where they can. 

Second, greening policies have further deepened the fragmentation, reshaping industries and disrupting critical supply chains necessary for a sustainable future. This is evident in the US and the EU greening policies, which aim to bring back domestic production of green technologies, driven by goals of energy independence and job creation.

However, these efforts come with their challenges. Domestic production often leads to inefficiencies and higher costs, as countries lack the economies of scale and expertise that global supply chains offer. Additionally, these new jobs will require a workforce capable of producing high-quality green energy products, which many countries currently lack. There is an extensive amount of data that shows that the US, EU and China are mutually dependent on each other for the import and export of environmental goods. If these greening policies are implemented as intended, then the growing fragmentation will pose significant impediments to reaching net-zero targets in the form of labour migration, and regional talent shortages, creating disparities in workforce expertise across nations.

Moreover, greening policies are contributing to growing competition for essential resources and infrastructure among major powers, which is driving nations to focus on their individual goals at the expense of collective progress. China’s power is unparalleled in this race. China has strategically invested in acquiring a talent pool from around the world to help it retain its spot as the largest rare earth industry. 

This was done by investing in earth-related patents that attracted talent worldwide by allowing them to license their intellectual property. Concerning rare earth-related patents, China surpassed the US and Japan in 2008 and 2009, respectively. In 2021, China’s six state-owned rare earth enterprises were merged to become one giant conglomerate, after the merger the conglomerate now owns almost 25% of global rare earth minerals. Due to a strong hold on patents and mineral refining industries, China was able to regulate the prices of rare earth metals in the global market. The prices were so low that companies which wanted to open new mining facilities would struggle to make profits and end in debt. Even if they were barely profitable they were acquired by Chinese conglomerates. China also allowed foreign high-tech industries to access their rare metals if they shifted their production facilities to China. When compared to European counterparts and the US, China also has the upper hand because of its cheap labour force. Most of them work in factories with manufacturing facilities.

If the IRA and NZIA can successfully re-shore manufacturing facilities to their respective territories, they will also be required to strengthen and diversify their supply chains of critical REEs. The race to secure these resources has led to increased geopolitical tensions, particularly in regions rich in such materials, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Australia. Countries lacking the infrastructure and technology to produce high-tech renewable goods are taking action to nationalise their mines as seen in Serbia, South Africa and Greenland because they recognise the strategic value of these resources. This is increasing the pressure on non-aligned countries forcing them to pick sides and trade exclusively further fragmenting global supply chains. As a result, GEF could reduce investments in renewable energy and electric vehicles by up to 30% by 2030, which would create significant obstacles for the race to net zero as demands for these minerals continue to rise.

The trade-off to become carbon neutral also comes with costs associated with human rights and environmental violations. Environmentally, mining operations pollute water and air, and some mines have particularly high CO2 emissions due to their energy intensity. For example, “water-intensive lithium mining in the Atacama desert in Chile, the world’s driest environment, has triggered a wave of legal battles over water rights pitching indigenous communities against multinational mining companies”. While aiding green transition, these policies simultaneously worsen environmental degradation and exacerbate GHG emissions. 

The impact of mining is much more harmful to people than the environment. People working in the mining sector are often prone to fatalities because of the explosives used or instant land sides which occur in the mines. People working in the mining sector are subjected to dust which causes breathing problems like asthma, and many workers inhale toxins and radioactive materials. In Peru, “heavy pollution from lead and zinc and copper mining has caused mental deficiencies in 40 per cent of children under 5 years”. Workers are often underpaid and exploited and in extreme cases, it forces child labour. The global push to reach carbon neutrality is essential, but the burden of sourcing these materials ethically lies with respective governments and mining companies. Unfortunately, most of this burden disproportionately falls on underdeveloped and developing countries while wealthier nations benefit from resulting green technologies.

Finally, a lack of effective collaboration among countries and institutions such as the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank. The global institutions are unable to stop the divisive trend of geo-economic fragmentation. 

Clauses in the IRA and Science Act that have resulted in export control of high-end semiconductors and allowed subsidies only on EVs assembled in North America are clear violations of WTO rules. The WTO has also struggled to implement trade reforms and settle trade disputes among nations, as a result, there has been a significant rise in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) around the world. This has led to regionalisation in machines, components and raw materials, which is “bound to lead to disruption, duplication and ultimately, lost efficiency”. Both the IMF and World Bank have faced in their lending practices when it comes to fragmented economies and concerns related to climate action. The WTO has faced challenges in preventing trade barriers and protectionist policies that disrupt the global supply chain. Despite the challenges, a joint statement by the IMF and World Bank acknowledges that they can make critical contributions as they have done in the past post-1944 in stabilising economic order.

Even if certain countries achieve net zero by 2050, the nationalistic approach of the US, the EU and China risks leaving many upcoming and emerging countries behind, further delaying Net Zero. The focus on energy independence has created a race to the bottom as countries with less economic and technological expertise will struggle to transition. Higher initial investment costs, unavailability of skilled labour, inefficient regulations and policies, and lack of stakeholder collaboration are the biggest barriers that emerging markets face in achieving Net Zero 2050. Without substantial support and equitable access to green technologies, they are at risk of being sidelined in the global transition. This uneven progress can create a two-speed green transition where wealthier nations reach their targets while poorer nations rely on fossil fuels. The disparity is likely to increase as protectionist policies continue to impose harsh tariffs and drive up the costs of green technologies, making them less affordable for low-income countries. The low and middle-income countries constitute 40 % of the world's population yet they spend only 7% of global spending on clean energy. Many of these countries are highly reliant on coal; Indonesia, India, Mongolia, and South Africa. Policies of the US and EU are attracting new investments in clean energy but they are making it more challenging for low-income countries as they lack investments. To be on the trajectory to achieve net zero, the world needs investments of $4.5 trillion in clean energy every year by 2030, as of 2023, it is around $1.8 trillion. Consequently, the global achievement of net zero is likely to be significantly delayed.  

7. Navigating Roadblocks: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 

While it might be difficult to predict the exact delay in achieving net zero by 2050, the conclusions of this research indicate that there could be a significant delay if global cooperation remains insufficient and the current trends continue. In 2023, looking at the developments from Europe’s energy crisis and deepening geoeconomic fragmentation, the IEA acknowledged that, “there is no low international cooperation route to limit warming to 1.5 °C and no slow route either”.  This underpins a very narrow pathway to achieve net zero targets. GEF, protectionist green policies and the competitive race for resources collectively impede a unified global transition to net zero emissions. The divergent approaches to achieving net zero by developed economies and developing economies further complicate this journey, ultimately risking the delay.

The urgency of global cooperation could not be overstated. The IMF, World Bank and the WTO need to adapt and play a stronger role in mitigating these divisions. Although the Bretton Woods Institutions have failed to curb GEF, they must prioritise and regulate the sharing of renewable technology and allocate funding properly so that fragmented economies do not impede net zero initiative. Policies which promote global equity such as offering financial and technological support to developing countries should come into action to accelerate the global transition. This has to happen mainly for the countries which are currently struggling to get investments to transition and are highly reliant on coal, oil and gas for their energy. 

Heavily reliant nations on oil and gas revenues, including OPEC+ countries and International Oil Companies (IOCs), must urgently diversify their economic strategies. Diversifying in clean energy, such as investing in solar or hydrogen energy, can offer these countries sustainable growth opportunities. Initiatives like the UAE’s commitment to significant solar investments and Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project are examples of effective diversification. However, such diversification needs to be scaled up, with prioritising renewable energy development. 

Countries that are rich in resources for renewable energy should not be forced to align between the emerging fragments of the global economy. Doing so will only heighten geopolitical tensions and disrupt the equitable distribution of these critical resources. Choosing trade partners based on need, rather than political or geopolitical alliance would contribute to a sustainable flow of capital and resources. A neutral stance could also encourage fair competition, drive down the prices and encourage them to engage with multiple partners. Moreover, this approach will help emerging nations focus on domestic development and environmental protection.

Lastly, the transition must be not only environmentally but also socially just. International institutions, respective governments and corporations must prioritise ethical sourcing and responsible supply chain management. Regulations and transparency initiatives can help to achieve this, ensuring fair wages, safe working conditions and protection of the local community. Without this, the transition will exacerbate inequality and injustice, particularly in the Global South. 

The challenges are immense, but so is the opportunity for transformative change. If the world can reimagine cooperation and realise that climate action is a shared opportunity, then there is still a levy within our reach. The future of the planet depends on the speed of action and unity of our purpose now more than ever. We must choose collaboration over division, for the cost of fragmentation is simply too costly.

Abbreviations: 

GVC- Global Value Chain

GFC- Global Financial Crisis

GEF- Geo-economic Fragmentation 

GHG Greenhouse Gases

REE- Rare Earth Elements 

IP- Intellectual Property

US- United States

EU- European Union 

DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo 

IRA- Inflation Reduction Act

GATT- General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs

WTO- World Trade Organisation

IEA- International Energy Agency

WEF-World Economic Forum

IMF- International Monetary Fund

EV- Electric Vehicles

PTA- Preferential Trade Agreements

RTA- Regional Trade Agreements 

ASEAN- The Association of South-East Asian Nations

BRICS- Brazil Russia India China and South Africa

BRI- Belt and Road Initiative

OBOR- One Belt One Road

AIID- Asia Infrastructure Development Bank

UTSR- United States Trade Representative

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

SEOs- State Owned Enterprises

FDI- Foreign Direct Investment

RRF- Recovery and Resilience Facility

NZIA- Net Zero Industrial Act

MIC25- Made in China 25

ICE- Internal Combustion Engine

IOC- International Oil Companies

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